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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARY DAY,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,

:

v.

:

STATE OF UTAH,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

:

Case No. 930135-CA
Priority No. 15

:

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to this Court's request dated October 6, 1994, the
Appellees submit the following response to Day's Petition for
Rehearing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT TROOPER COLYAR
WOULD HAVE BEEN IMMUNE AT COMMON LAW PROM
DAY'S CLAIMS
This court should deny Day's petition for rehearing because
Day has failed to show that the court incorrectly ruled that
Trooper Colyar would have been immune at common law from Day's
claims. In her petition, Day posits that "the common law . . . has
always held that peace officers are liable for their negligent acts
without regard to any discretionary/ministerial distinctions."
Petition for Rehearing at 2.

This postulate

Although

classified

much police

work

was

at

is incorrect.
common

law as

ministerial, numerous cases refute the notion that there was a
1

general rule of police liability for even discretionary conduct.
For example, in Clinton v. Nelson, the territorial Utah
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of nonsuit in an action for false
imprisonment and cruel treatment against the United States Marshall
for the territory by a prisoner who claimed a deputy marshall
improperly detained him in the federal penitentiary and that the
"treatment of the prisoner was so maliciously cruel as to entitle
him to damages."

Clinton v. Nelson, 2 Utah 284, 290 (1877-80).

The court rejected the prisoner's claim that the deputy
improperly held him in the penitentiary, stating, "The law requires
the marshall to safely keep such prisoners, and to do so he must
have a reasonable discretion as to where he shall do so within his
district." Id. The court further rejected the prisoner's claim of
cruel treatment:

"The warrant being regular, and the court having

jurisdiction to issue it, the officer is not liable, says Hilliard,
without proof of express malice.
. .

Hill, on Torts, 184, 3d ed. . .

No such malice has been shown."

Id.1

See also Marks v.

Sullivan, 9 Utah 12, 33 P. 224, 227 (1893) (dismissing claims
against constable for assault and battery and false imprisonment
where arrest warrant was valid on its face, even though plaintiff
alleged constable knew warrant was void).
Nearly half a century later, the Utah Supreme Court again
recognized that in some circumstances, a police officer could
x

The court also relied on the alternative rationale that "a
ministerial officer, in performing his duties, if he acts in good
faith, is only liable for compensatory damages for injuries against
the law, and is not liable for exemplary damages." Clinton v.
Nelson, 2 Utah at 290-91.
2

assert good faith or the absence of malice in defense of a claim of
wrongful official conduct.

In Roe v. Lundstrom, the court held a

city police officer liable in trespass for acting outside the scope
of his authority by interfering with an unlicensed retailer's sale
of merchandise. Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P.2d 1228, 1332
(1936) . In so holding, the court stated:
The defendants allege . . . that whatever they did was
done in good faith and in the exercise of their best
judgment as officers in the enforcement of the ordinances
of Logan City . . . .
The question of motive may be
material in some cases as where the conduct is of such a
character as to be qualifiedly privileged, or as
involving the right to recover punitive damages.
Id.
Indeed, common law liability was generally not imposed on
police officers for false arrest, false imprisonment, actions taken
under process valid on its face, or for injury to persons to whom
no official duty was owed.
Torts

§§ 25 6c 108(d)

See William L. Prosser, Prosser on

(1941).

All of these privileges and

immunities2 were ultimately grounded in notions of judicial and
quasi-judicial immunity. They are simply specific applications of
the broader common law rule of immunity for official discretionary
decisions.
Officers:

See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Damage Actions, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 209, 219 (1963) .

That broader immunity rule applied to all public officials,

2

These doctrines were variously called privileges and
immunities. For example, in his 1941 hornbook, Professor Prosser
classified both the discretionary function immunity and the
privilege to arrest with a warrant as both privileges and
immunities. See William L. Prosser, Prosser on Torts § 25(c) & (d)
(privileges) and § 108(c) (immunities) (1941).
3

including police officers in their quasi-judicial role.

See

William L. Prosser, Prosser on Torts § 108(c), at 1063 & 1075
(1941)

(discussing

immunities

from

liability

for arrest and

execution of process under general category for discretionary
function immunity for public officers); 57 C.J. Sheriffs and
Constables § 184 ("While the general rule of liability above stated
applies always to breaches by a sheriff or constable of his
ministerial duties, no liability can arise out of what he has done
when acting in a judicial capacity, even though he has acted
corruptly, unless he has maliciously deprived some person of his
rights."); 70 Am. Jur. 2d Sheriffs, Police, and Constables § 158
(1987) ("The limited immunity for discretionary conduct extended to
public officials generally also applies to the acts of police
officers.").
Contrary to Day's suggestion, police officers were categorized
as "public officials" at common law.

See 47 Am. Jur. Sheriffs,

Police, and Constables § 5 (1943) ("Peace officers are generally
classed as public officers.").

Moreover, their dual status as

ministerial officers and discretionary or quasi-judicial officers
was recognized.

See 22 R.C.L. Public Officers § 25 (1918) ("The

same person may act both as a judicial and a ministerial officer.
For example, a sheriff with an execution against the property of a
particular individual acts in executing it only as a ministerial
officer.

But the same officer when he is authorized by law to

suppress a mob has more or less of discretionary

authority

intrusted to him."); 24 R.C.L. Sheriffs § 15 (1919) ("Under special
4

acts a sheriff may be authorized to act judicially in certain
matters, and where he so acts, the rule applies that no judicial
officer, however, low his grade as such, is responsible for mere
error of judgment committed by him in the regular discharge of the
duties of his office.")
None of the Utah cases Day cites
inconsistent with the above principles.
immunity for police officers.

in her petition are
None expressly address

More importantly, none impose

liability on a police officer for negligent performance of a
discretionary act within the scope of the officer's authority.
For example, in Geros v. Harries, the court held a county
sheriff's deputy liable for shooting a restaurant owner who fled
the restaurant during the execution of a search and seizure
warrant.

Geros v. Harries, 65 Utah 227, 236 P. 220, 221 (1925).

In so ruling, the court relied upon the common law rule that a
police officer had authority to use force in effecting an arrest
only when the suspect was a felon:
[I]t must be remembered that if the [restaurant owner]
was guilty of any crime it was at most a mere
misdemeanor, and hence the defendants were not justified
in shooting him, although he made or would have made his
attempted escape effective. The law in that regard is
clearly and correctly stated by the Supreme Court of
Mississippi in Brown v. Weaver. It is there said: "An
officer has no right to shoot at a person who is merely
running away from him, without committing any violence,
when under arrest for a misdemeanor.
The wrongful
shooting by a deputy sheriff of a prisoner attempting to
escape from arrest for a misdemeanor is an official act
which creates a liability on the sheriff's bond."
Geros. 236 P. at 224 (citing Brown v. Weaver. 23 So. 388 (Miss.
1898).

Thus, the court imposed liability because the deputy
5

exceeded his authority, not because of any general rule that police
officers were liable for even their discretionary acts.3
That the Geros holding rests on the unlawful nature of the
shooting, rather than on a general principle of police officer
liability as Day contends, is further supported by the language of
the Colorado Supreme Court in a similar case around the time Geros
was decided.

In Corder v. People, the court held a deputy sheriff

liable for shooting and injuring a Halloween prankster. Corder v.
People, 287 P. 85 (Colo. 1930) .

In affirming a judgment for the

injured boy, the court noted that the deputy had also been
criminally tried and convicted of the shooting.

Id. at 87. After

determining that the shooting had been an official act, making his
surety liable on its bond, the court concluded as follows:

"The

defendant, as the jury found, was guilty of an unlawful act in
shooting the [prankster].

For the lawful act of a peace officer,

of course, no liability attaches.

3

It is only for unlawful acts

The A.L.R. annotators also apparently viewed the case as
hinging upon the deputy's lack of authority to use force under the
circumstances. They placed the court's statement that "an officer,
when he offends, stands precisely upon the same footing as the
citizen" under the West topic on public officers in general with a
citation to the legal encyclopedia Ruling Case Law. See 39 A.L.R.
1297, 1298 (headnote 8) . That reference is to an article on
"Public Officers," which states: "Public officers are not as a
rule personally liable for acts performed by them in the line of
their duties . . . . But the protection extends only to acts done
in the line of official duty. Therefore if an officer, even while
acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on
him by law he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a
public agent. In the eye of the law his acts then are wholly
without authority. It is even a doctrine of the common law that if
a public officer abuses the process conferring authority on him to
act he may render himself a trespasser ab initio." 22 R.C.L.
Public Officers § 152, at 478-79 (1918).
6

that legal liability and damages are imposed."

Id. at 89.

The decision in Jackson v. Harries, also cited by Day, is
similarly explained.

There, three deputy sheriffs "used unusual

and unnecessary force" in raiding a home to execute a search and
seizure warrant. Jackson v. Harries, 65 Utah 282, 236 P. 234, 236
(1925).

The occupant of the home sued for "great pain and mental

anguish." Id. at 235. Upholding a judgment for the home occupant,
the court stated, "Officers, like others, will be protected only so
long as they act within the law."

Id. at 236. Accordingly, as in

Geros, the deputies' liability in Jackson was based on the fact
that their conduct exceeded their authority, not the classification
of the conduct as ministerial or the application of a general rule
of police liability.
In short, the Utah cases cited by Day are consistent with the
ministerial-discretionary function distinction applied at common
law to all public officials.4 For all public officials, the common
4

The other cases Day cited in which the Utah court imposed
liability on a police officer are inapposite because the conduct
involved was clearly a ministerial function and the question of
immunity was neither raised nor discussed on appeal. In Snell v.
Crowe, for example, a constable was held liable in damages for
seizing personal property of a third party under a writ of
attachment against the property of a debtor.
Snell v. Crowe. 3
Utah 26, 5 P. 522, 523-24 (1881). But execution of civil process
was regarded at common law as a ministerial function. See William
L. Prosser, Prosser on Torts § 25, at 154 (1941).
Similarly, in Benally v. Robinson, a police officer was held
liable for fatal injuries sustained by an intoxicated detainee who
fell through an open door down some stairs in the booking area of
the jail. Benally v. Robinson, 14 Utah 2d 6, 376 P.2d 388, 389-90
(1962) . On appeal, the officer argued that he had no duty to
protect an intoxicated person from injury and the court rejected
that argument, holding that once the officer took the detainee into
custody, the officer assumed the duty to use due care to protect
the detainee from harm. Id. at 390. The issue of immunity was not
7

law immunity for discretionary functions applied only to acts
within the scope of the official's authority.

Absent such

authority, the official had no power to commit the act at all,
whether or not the act involved discretion or judgment. See, e.g. .
Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P.2d 1228, 1131 (1936) (holding
three city commissioners liable in trespass, stating,

l!

[A public

officer] may not . . . claim immunity for the commission of an act
entirely outside the scope of his official duties).
Moreover,

the

treatises

and

articles Day

cites

do not

generally support her claim of an all-inclusive rule of police
liability.

Most merely recite specific categories of police

conduct which have been classified as ministerial, none of which
apply to Day's claims against Trooper Colyar.

For example,

Professor Jaffe's 1963 law review article states that
there are areas, notably actions against police officers
for false arrest, battery, and trespass . . . where
recovery has long been allowed, despite the exercise by
the officer of more than a "merely ministerial" function.
This is particularly clear in the case of police officer,
who are called upon to make extremely difficult factual
choices, and important, if unarticulated, policy
decisions:
for example, whether to regard certain
conduct or certain appearances as sufficient evidence to
arrest or search.
Jaffe, supra, at 218-19. Professor Jaffe goes on to say, however,
In fact the law recognizes the discretionary element here
raised on appeal, nor does it appear to have been a valid defense
since in booking a detainee into jail the officer was performing a
standard police function that was not even arguably discretionary.
Thus, Benally is consistent both with the general common law rule
of official liability for ministerial functions and the common law
classification of most police functions as ministerial; it does not
rest on any general principle of police officer liability for
negligence acts.
8

when in its definition of the power to arrest it
immunizes certain "reasonable" judgments of the officer.
However, the officer's immunity is limited to his
reasonable actions; it is not that total immunity usual
in an area classified as discretionary.
Id. at 219.

To the extent that any of the secondary authorities

cited by Day appear to state a general rule of police liability,
they can be explained as implicitly limited to ministerial police
functions. Moreover, whatever the law elsewhere, the existence of
a general rule of police liability in Utah must be seriously
doubted in light of the decisions in Clinton v. Nelson, 2 Utah at
290, and Roe v. Lundstrom, 57 P.2d at 1332.

Given the unique

history of this state, this court cannot validly assume that the
decisions of other American common law courts at or near the time
of Utah's statehood signify what the Utah court would have decided
at that time. See generally, Jerrold S. Jensen, The Common Law of
England in the Territory of Utah, 60 Utah Historical Quarterly 4
(Winter 1992) (discussing general suspicion and even hostility of
early Utah courts toward common law tradition).
In deciding that Trooper Colyar would have been immune from
Day's claims under early Utah common law, this court noted that
"the parties have not cited any Utah caselaw from near the time of
statehood which addresses immunity for police officers, and we have
not found any." Day v. State, 247 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 22 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) . In her petition for rehearing, Day still has not cited
any Utah case law expressly addressing police officer immunity at
common law.

On the other hand, Clinton v. Nelson. 2 Utah at 290,

and Roe v. Lundstrom, 57 P.2d at 1332, appear to recognize a
9

discretionary function immunity for police officers in Utah near
the turn of the nineteenth century.
Moreover, in the absence of Utah cases on point from the
relevant era, this court must "simply [make its] best assessment of
what a court during that era would have ruled if the issue had
arisen."

Day, 247 Utah Adv. Rep. at 23. As this court noted, in

recent decisions courts have declined to impose liability on police
officers under the circumstances of this case.

Day v. State, 247

Utah Adv. Rep. at 23 (citing Tice v. Cramer, 627 A.2d 1090, 1108
(N.J. 1993) and Thornton v. Shore, 666 P.2d 655, 665 (Kan. 1983));
see also Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Minn. 1992) (en
banc). As numerous commentators have noted, the application of the
ministerial-discretionary

function distinction has always been

essentially a policy determination.
291.

See, e.g., Jaffe, supra, at

While high speed vehicles are relatively new, "the need to

encourage the pursuit and apprehension of lawbreakers" is timeless.
See Day, 247 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24.
precedent,

this

court

may

properly

Thus, absent controlling
rely

on

the

policy

determinations of contemporary decisions in assessing what the Utah
court would have decided if it had addressed a similar case around
the turn of the last century.
In any event, if this court has any serious doubt whether
Trooper Colyar would have been held liable for Day's claims at
common law, it must reject Day's claim that the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act violates the open courts clause. "The party attacking
the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of affirmatively
10

demonstrating that the statute is unconstitutional."

Kennecott

Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) . Unless
Day can affirmatively establish that the Utah Supreme Court would
have sustained her claim nearly a century ago, she cannot establish
the existence of any right shielded by the open courts clause.
Day, 247 Utah Adv. Rep. at 23.

POINT II
DAY HAS WAIVED THE ISSUE OP TROOPER COLYAR'S
COMMON LAW LIABILITY BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY
ADDRESS THE ISSUE IN EITHER HER OPENING OR
REPLY BRIEF
Day has waived her arguments concerning

the common law

liability of police officers by failing to assert them at any time
before filing her petition for rehearing. This court has held many
times that it will not consider issues inadequately briefed either
in the trial court or on appeal.

See, e.g. , State v. Scott, 860

P.2d 1005, 1007 n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (declining to consider
inadequately briefed state constitutional issue).
Moreover, as noted in Point I above, M[t]he party attacking
the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating that the statute is unconstitutional."

Kennecott

Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993).

Thus,

in asserting her claim under the open courts clause, it was
incumbent upon Day to adequately demonstrate that her claim
implicated a right protected by the open courts clause.
Despite numerous opportunities to do so, Day never briefed her
claim that she had a common law remedy against Trooper Colyar until
11

she filed her petition for rehearing.

As initially noted in the

State's opening brief in this appeal, Day never cited any authority
in her opening brief for the proposition that she had a legal
remedy for her injuries at common law at the time of statehood.
Brief of State Appellees, at 30. That deficiency was not corrected
in Day's reply brief on this appeal.

Nor in her letter to the

court filed under Rule 24 (j) after oral argument was held in this
case# did Day cite any of the authorities she now cites in her
petition for rehearing.

See Letter from Craig L. Boorman to Clerk

of the Court dated May 17, 1994 (responding to State's Rule 24 (j)
citations). The remaining arguments Day raises in her petition for
rehearing also come too late.
Day's theory of liability has shifted with each successive
filing in this case.

It continues to shift even now.

See Motion

to File Supplement to Appellant's Petition for Rehearing dated
October 27, 1994.

This court should apply its well-established

waiver doctrine and deny Day's petition for rehearing.

CONCLUSION
This court should deny Day's petition for rehearing because
Day has failed to show that Trooper Colyar would not have been
protected under early Utah common law by discretionary function
immunity.

Contrary to Day's claim in her petition for rehearing,

near the turn of the nineteenth century, the Utah court recognized
police immunity for discretionary conduct. The Utah cases cited by
Day are inapposite because they concern police conduct outside the
12

scope of authority -- conduct for which any public official would
have been liable.
In any event, Day has waived her argument concerning Trooper
Colyar's common law liability by failing to raise it before now.
The other arguments raised in Day's petition have similarly been
waived.
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JAN GRAHAM
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